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DIAGNOSING EFFICIENCY OR DISTORTION IN DISCRETE
SCREENING
Abstract: We study the screening or nonlinear pricing for discrete consumer types
when the single-crossing condition need not hold. A method is developed to reveal social
efficiency or distortion of equilibria from market observations. The two known indicators of
efficiency, namely absence of almost-envy by a consumer for other consumer’s package; or
per-package profit similarity, are extended. The third, empirically more useful, new crite-
rion is based on demand parametrization, observed tariffs, package sizes, and some approx-
imate estimate of marginal cost. Application of this criterion to several consumer goods
shows existence of overall efficiency or oversized packages in reality, both contradicting
Spence-Mirrlees condition. The methodological contribution is elaborating “envy-graph”
notions to desribe solution structures.
Key words: second-degree price discrimination, self-selection, multidimensional screen-
ing, no single-crossing, socially efficient price discrimination.
JEL Codes: D42, D82, L10, L12, L40
1. INTRODUCTION
For a long period, many observed pricing practices in real life have challenged economists
to find the motivation for their practice. As noted in a seminal paper by Oi (1971, p.77),
“The intricate pricing schemes observed in the antitrust literature are testimony to the
fact that the imagination of a greedy entrepreneur outstrips the analytic ability of the
economist.” This challenge seems to be even tougher today. With many nonlinear pricing
strategies in practice today, economists not only are challenged to find an economic rationale
for their practice, but these pricing strategies have motivated them to put forward new
theoretical models, as witnessed by the growing literature on nonlinear pricing.
Consider some examples that initially motivated this paper. In Japan, for quite a long
period of time, two different sized containers (300ml and 500ml) of Coca-Cola are sold
through the vending machines at the same price (Y120) at the tourist places. This seem-
ingly “paradoxical pricing” has a simple explanation, given below, but our main question
is different: Is this information sufficient (or what else should we know) to diagnose this
pricing practice as socially efficient or distorted? Another kind of information is when
we know that a seller realizes the same profit from a bigger or a smaller package. Or
when all customers report in a questionarie that they strongly prefer a smaller 470 ml. of
Coca-Cola for drinking in the car for $1.29, but strongly prefer a bigger 1000 ml. bottle
($1.59) for home consumption. Can we rationalize these pricing practices from such limited
information, and, at the same time, infer whether they are socially efficient or distorted?
Theoretically speaking, these are examples of nonlinear pricing, or screening, or the
so-called “second-degree price discrimination.” In particular, discrete screening, or package
pricing, means that a seller offers a product or service using a menu (product line) of
discrete packages containing different quantities or qualities at some fixed tariffs on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis. Different groups of consumers self-select packages from the offered menu
by comparing their valuations of the packages (willingness to pay) to the tariffs.
The literature on screening, or nonlinear pricing (or nonlinear taxation which is mathe-
matically almost equivalent) is vast and growing.1 Most earlier papers maintain the single-
crossing condition (Spence-Mirrlees Condition, or SMC), which requires that both total
and marginal willingness to pay for quantity is increasing in consumer’s type parameter.
Equivalently, the valuation curves of different consumers cross only once and the demand
curves do not cross. This situation can be named (vertically) “ordered” valuations. In
contrast, there can be valuations with unknown ordering, where demands can cross, they
are the main focus of this paper. This could be the case, for example, when type 1 con-
sumers with high income but limited storage space (e.g., “yuppies”) buy a smaller package,
while type 2 consumers have low income but a larger storage space (e.g.,“families”), so
prefer to buy a larger package. Thus the demand curve for type 1 consumers starts high
but intersects the demand curve of type 2 consumers (see Srinagesh and Bradburd (1989)
and some examples below). In terms of the related product-line literature (e.g., Mussa and
Rosen (1978)), where quality stands for quantity, there is a delineation between vertical
(“ordered”) products/consumers differentiation, and horizontal (“non-ordered,” or ordered
in some other way) differentiation. This paper includes both these cases, as well as cases
without a definite vertical or horizontal structure of preferences. Our approach is not to
asume, but rather to reveal a structure of this kind.
1 Early papers include Spence (1976), Mussa and Rosen (1977), Katz (1983), Maskin and Riley (1984),
and a survey by Varian (1989). More recent comprehensive reviews on pricing or taxation strategies based
on self-selection for discrete and continuous types of consumers without pre-determined ordering can be
found in Armstrong (2007), Rochet and Stole (2003), and Stole (2007).
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For SMC or (vertically) ordered case, the two important textbook results (see Tirole
(1994), p.149) are: (i) The optimal tariff for a smaller package can neither be the same nor
can it be higher than for the bigger one, the same ordering holds for optimal per-package
profits; (ii) All smaller packages result in underprovision of quantity or quality in each
package, but the quantity in the biggest package is socially efficient, i.e., non-distorted (the
so-called “efficiency-at-the-top” result). Hence, when valuations are “ordered,” the opti-
mal solution can neither result in overprovision (oversized packages), nor can all packages
contain socially efficient quantities.
For situations without the SMC, Katz (1983) constructs a numerical example (Example
1) of package oversizing for “non-ordered” case. Similar (quality) overprovision result is also
illustrated graphically in Donnenfeld and White (1988) for some types of valuations. For
two types of consumers, Srinagesh and Bradburd (1989) derive specific sufficient conditions
for the smaller package to be efficient, whereas the bigger one is oversized (too much quality)
and brings lower profits. This outcome seems to be different from the standard result, but
essentially it is very similar, just “big” and “small” packages are interchanged under their
assumption, which is opposite to SMC.
Can all packages be free of distortion in “non-ordered” case? Such completely-efficient
examples of screening are mentioned in several papers, reviewed, in particular, in Rochet
and Stole (2003). Guesnerie and Seade (1982) also show that overall efficiency may emerge.
It is the case when all self-selection constraints are non-active (“active” means “becoming
equality”).2 Specifically, Guesnerie and Seade (1982), under valuation concavity claim that
any package, free of active incentive-compatibility (IC) constraints “to” this package must
be non-distorted. Brito et al. (1990) and Andersson (2005) try to generalize this claim to
non-concave case (see comments to our Proposition 1). Guesnerie and Seade, under very
specific assumption of non-coinciding derivatives, prove also the converse — for inefficiency
at least one constraint must be active (their Propositions 2 and 4).
As to other indicators of efficiency, Brito et al. (1990) state that the package with
highest per-package profit must be efficient.
In this paper, the main goal is building a theory of diagnosing social efficiency or qual-
ity/quantity distortion when observing a market. It means developing a methodology for
2Donnenfeld and White (1988) also conjecture that non-active constraint is a sufficient condition for
efficiency (see note 2, p. 400).
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empirical studies of screening (such studies being potentially very interesting).3 This plan
of investigation culminates in market-efficiency criterion (Theorems 1, 2) and in instruc-
tions how to apply this criterion to real-life cases (Section 4). However, the discussion
starts with pure theory: introducing several novel notions needed, notably envy-graphs
(that describe the list of active/binding constraints), and proving, correcting or enforcing
the auxiliary criteria of efficiency. Namely, efficiency can manifest itself in terms of sim-
ilar profits per package, or/and in terms of “no-envy” solution structure. Though these
efficiency indicators: same profits or no-envy – are rarely observable variables, but they
constitute the basis for Theorems 1, 2.
Usually screening theory designes the optimal package menu based on known consumers’
valuations. Our theorems are the first attempt to solve the inverse problem: partially reveal
valuations from observing the actual menu, assuming the seller rational and informed of
the valuations. In some sense the theorems are similar to preference-revelation approach,
but revelation is only partial, and data describe a price-discriminating market, in contrast
to classical uniform-price market. Such inverse approach is quite new.
The first empirical result, achieved on this path when illustrating the application of
our method, is that efficiency or distortion of pricing can be sometimes inferred from
observations even without knowing the exact marginal cost. Second, Table 1 (page 35)
shows that all theoretically predicted cases – efficiency, under- and oversizing – exist in
pricing practice, not only ordered, but also non-ordered valuations are common. Thus,
Spence-Mirrlees condition, so popular in theory, lacks empirical support within our sample.
Our methodology enables to estimate the type of valuations’ ordering on any sample of
markets/commodities. Besides, it can work as rough but practical criterion of (in-)efficiency
in price-discriminating markets, like Lerner index do in uniform-price markets. On the
other hand, we can compare our method to Robinson-Schmalensee (in-)efficiency criterion
for third-degree price discrimination (when discrimination does not open new markets, it
brings inefficiency). In our case, similar simplifying assumption of linear or parameterized
demands is also needed, but linearity itself appears not so crucial for the outcome.
Section 2 contains the model and introduces a new piece of graph theory to screening.4
3 For instance, Gerstner and Hess (1987) empirically verify conditions for discounts or premiums
under some assumption like single-crossing. In contrast, we study efficiency and distortion and
do not impose any prior assumptions on valuations ordering.
4 Graph language has already been used occasionally in screening literature, see, e.g., “cycles
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The new notions generally useful for studying non-ordered or multidimensional screening
are: almost-envy, binding-envy and envy-graphs. A variety of graphs is shown plausible at
solutions. Section 2 ends with explaining the inverse problem of screening: revealing such
structures and valuations from observations.
In Section 3, two Propositions, two Theorems and most practical Corollary 3.2 state
three empirical criteria of either efficiency, or oversizing/undersizing of packages. The
menu is diagnosed as socially efficient: (1) when no consumer “almost-envies” any other
consumer’s package; or (2) when profit per package is the same for all sizes. Most practical
criterion (3), based on simplifying assumptions of linear demands (Theorem 2, Corollary
3.2), or otherwise parameterized demands (Theorem 1), states that when observed tariffs,
package sizes and an approximate estimate of marginal cost satisfy certain inequalities (es-
sentially, quantity discount should not be too low), then the price discrimination observed
is efficient, otherwise we detect under- or oversizing.
In Section 4, the theorems obtained are applied to several real-life examples (see Table 1,
page 35). Section 5 concludes. Appendix contains counter-examples showing impossibility
to enforce propositions, most proofs, useful lemmas, and a remark on generalization to
taxation screening or to multi-dimensional screening, that makes the story of efficiency
revelation rather complete.
2. MODEL, MAIN NOTIONS AND QUESTIONS
2.1 Discrete Screening Model
The standard screening model for discrete types of consumers or a package-pricing game
can be formulated as follows. Assume that a monopolist (a principal) offers a menu (x, T ) of
n packages, i.e., quality- or quantity-tariff bundles (x, T ) = ((x1, T1), .., (xn, Tn)) ∈R2n to
a population I comprised of n different types of consumers (agents) i ∈ I := {1, ..., n};
and mi > 0 denotes the number of consumers of type i (then mi ∈ Z+), or the probability
(frequency) of this type (thenmi ∈(0, 1)).5 By convention, we denote an additional (n+1)th
of L-links” in Guesnerie and Seade (1982), “paths” and “trees” in Rochet and Stole (2003). Our
novelty is in showing many different kinds of structures with elaborate graph terms, some examples
and important lemmas.
5 A standard simplification in such models is that the same consumer buying twice during a
given period is equivalent to two similar consumers buying once. Thereby, the “total number of
consumers”
∑
imi is just the number of packages that can be sold.
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package (x0, T0) ≡ (0, 0) representing the case when a consumer does not buy at all. The
preferences of different types of consumers are known to the seller, but a particular type
cannot be identified, thus making personal discrimination infeasible. Each agent selects a
single package and purchase of multiple packages and arbitrage are prevented. The single-
package assumption should be interpreted as in Gerstner and Hess (1987): some chosen
quantity/quality xi is the package-size usually preferred by the agent, but not the total
quantity she is willing to consume monthly or in some other specified period. The utility
functions are assumed to be quasi-linear: ui(xi, Ti) = Vi(xi)−Ti, where xi is quantity and Ti
is the total outlay or tariff. The willingness to pay, or the “monetary valuation function”
Vi(·) satisfies the normalization assumption Vi(0) = 0, ∀i. Additionally, concavity in xi
comes into play when necessary, but we make no other assumptions on utility functions.6
On producer’s side, the cost function is separable w.r.t. agents, i.e., it takes the form∑
imiC(xi), where C(·) is a per-package cost function without any restrictions (a non-
linear function C(·) can be important to reflect cost of packaging and other fixed per-
package costs, while fixed cost of entire business does influence the menu design). Two
other standard assumptions used are that all consumers of a given type choose the same
package, and among the equally-preferred packages they choose the package preferred by
the principal. Then the principal’s profit-maximization problem is as follows.
pi(x, T ) =
n∑
i=1
mi(Ti−C(xi))→ max
(x,T )∈R2n
, s.t. (1)
Vi(xi)− Ti ≥ Vi(xk)− Tk ∀i ∈ I, ∀k ∈ I ∪ {0}, (2)
(x0, T0) := (0, 0). (3)
The system of constraints (1)–(2) define feasible assignments.
By formally introducing a dummy agent #0, whose package is (0, 0), the traditional
“participation constraints” Vi(xi) − Ti ≥ 0 are treated here as special types of incentive-
compatibility (IC) constraints (2 ).
6 Concerning generality of our model, note that disutility from too-large a quantity or a sa-
tiable demand is allowed in our setting. Further, our approach and many our assertions are easy to
extend to multidimensional products, as discussed in the Appendix. Note also, that we do not re-
quire positivity of Ti, so the model is directly applicable to labor contracts where Ti < 0, V ′i < 0.
The assumption of quasi-linearity is made mostly for expositional convenience, and normalization
Vi(0) = 0 is also not necessary. Normalization to an arbitrary reservation utility u0 allows one
to apply the analysis to the problem of Pareto-efficient taxation.
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To complete the discussion of this screening setting, we add that the above profit-
maximization program is equivalent, in certain sense, to a tax-optimization problem, as
discussed in Appendix. So, one can apply our approach and the results below to a tax-
optimization problem.
2.2. Envy, Net valuations, Efficiency and Envy-graphs
Now we introduce several needed notions, some of them being novel in the screening
literature.
The IC constraint can be interpreted in terms of “envy.” First version of this useful
term was first introduced, most probably, in Foley (1967), also used in Wilson (1993); and
infrequently in other papers. In this paper, we use a new and more specific definition.
A constraint with label (i, k) requires that the seller designes an assignment (menu of
packages) where an agent i should not strictly-envy the k-th package in the sense that k-th
package should not bring higher utility to i than the i-th package. When a constraint (i, j)
is active (i.e., it becomes an equality Vi(xi)−Ti = Vi(xj)−Tj), it is interpreted as almost-
envy or, for brevity, A-envy from i to j and is denoted as (i→ j). When it is binding (i.e.,
when the solution is altered by this constraint), the situation is referred to as binding-envy
or B-envy and is denoted by (i 99K j). In other words, if we denote the optimal profit as
p¯i and the best profit from a relaxed problem (where constraint (i, j) is dropped) as p¯i−(i,j),
then p¯i < p¯i−(i,j) ⇔(i 99K j).
Finally, locally-binding almost-envy or LBA-envy denoted as (i ⇒ j) means that
the related constraint is locally-binding at the given solution point. It means that the
constraint has a strictly positive Lagrangian multiplier λij > 0 at this solution, i.e., any
small relaxation of this constraint increases the objective function.
Term Symbol Meaning
A-envy (i, j) (i→ j) ⇔ Vi(xi)− Ti = Vi(xj)− Tj
B-envy (i, j) (i 99K j) ⇔ p¯i < p¯i−(i,j)
LBA-envy (i, j) (i⇒ j) ⇔ λij > 0
Obviously, any LBA constraint must be active and binding, so LBA is the strongest
notion in the sense L ⊂ B ∩A and also the most useful for conclusions. From optimization
theory we know that under convex optimization binding constraints are always active and
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reverse: generically often (i.e., with probability 1 but not always) active constraints are
binding and locally-binding also. But the screening problem is usually non-convex even
under strictly concave utitilies, so these distinctions among A, B, LBA may turn out im-
portant here, as the reader will see.7 For these occasions, the list of constraints SB = B \A
binding but not active will be named as “shadow-binding envy,” or SB-envy, which may
bring paradoxical effects as discussed in Examples A.1, and A.2 in Appendix, (page 33).
We call a package j A-envy-free when there is no A-envy i → j towards it from any
other consumer i, and i is A-envy-disconnected with j when there is no A-envy links to or
from j. Similar terms relate to B-envy.
Further, for our analysis, in addition to valuations Vi, we also need the inverse demands
Pi(xi) = V˙i(xi) (derivatives of valuations, further denoted by dot: V˙i(xi) :=
d
dxi
Vi(xi)) and
the notion of net-of-cost valuations, or just net valuations vi(xi) =Vi(xi) − C(xi).8 To
comprehend how all these notions are related, see Fig.1 (page 9). It explains package
pricing for both vertically ordered (left panel) and non-ordered valuations (right panel).
Specifically, Fig.1 describes an example of two linear demands Pi(xi) = ai − aidixi and
linear costs C(xi) = cxi, (ai > 0, di > 0, c > 0), both demands depicted in the same figure.
Later on, this example will be used to illustrate several statements in the paper, including
comparative statics of the solution w.r.t. parameters ai, di (Fig.3, page 22).
The top graphs in both panels represent the quantity-tariff space, and the two thick
dots show the profit-maximizing package-menu ((x¯1, T¯1),(x¯2, T¯2)). The valuation functions
Vi(xi) =
∫ xi
0
Pi(t)dt = aixi − aix
2
i
2di
are represented by the indifference curves of utility
functions originating from (0, 0). Thick curves depict active indifference curves at the
equilibrium point (x¯, T¯ ). As to the direction, the lower is the indifference curve, the better
for the consumer. So, the second consumer in the left panel enjoys some consumer surplus
si > 0 at the equilibrium (but other consumers do not). Another indifference curve Vi(xi)
7 The simplest example of a non-convex optimization when such distinction matters is: maxi-
mize y = x on an admissible two-part setX = [0, 1]∪[2, 3] with either two additional constraints:
x ≤ 1 and x ≤ 1.5, or only the second one. In the first case, the additional constraint x ≤ 1 is
active by itself, but not binding at optimum x¯ = 1. In the second case, x ≤ 1.5 is binding by
itself but not active. So none of the two is LBA. This distinction between binding and active con-
straints is not equivalent to Kuhn-Tucker constraint qualification condition, as two our referees
did suppose.
8 Net valuation can be viewed as joint welfare function of this consumer and the seller. This
notion is justified when marginal costs are separable w.r.t. consumers, fixed cost of starting
production not affecting the menu properties.
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Figure 1: Valuations, net valuations and optimal packages.
(thin and dashed) includes all packages where the consumer is indifferent to participate or
not in the trade.
On the seller’s side, the dashed isoprofit lines pii(xi, Ti) = Ti − cxi represent profit
per package (net-tariff ti) to be maximized, the higher the indifference line, the higher
this profit. The total profit is the weighted sum of net tariffs. Naturally, these lines are
parallel to the cost function cx. The tangency points (x¯1, T¯1), (x¯2, T¯ 2) of isoprofit lines with
valuation curves denote the welfare-maximizing (efficient) packages. In the middle layer
of the two panels, these efficient quantities relate to the intersections of marginal utilities
and marginal costs, and in the lowest graphs these are the peaks of net valuations. These
efficient points x1, x2 coincide with the solution shown in the right panel, but not in the
left one. This means distortion for the smaller package (a standard result for the ordered
case).
Definition: In a package-menu (x¯, T¯ ), we call one of its packages (x¯i, T¯i) efficient
(socially or first-best-Pareto optimal, or full-information solution), when it maximizes the
joint welfare of this agent and the principal, all other packages being fixed, i.e., x¯i ∈
argmaxz∈R (Vi(z)−C(z)), and in the opposite case the package is distorted (over-sized or
under-sized). The efficient package-menu (x¯, T¯ ) maximizes total welfare, i.e., it does not
include distorted packages.
It is well known that efficiency or distortion is tightly connected with so-called “envy-
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structure” of the package-menu (Guesnerie and Seade (1982) call such structure “L-links”).
Before formulating such propositions, it is useful to observe a variety of envy-structures
possible at solutions, and also to introduce the graph terms needed for the proofs and
explanations.
An A-envy-structure of a menu (x¯, T¯ ) is the list of its active constraints. It can be
characterized using notions of graph theory. In an A-envy-graph G(x¯, T¯ ), the consumer
types or packages are depicted as “nodes” and the constraints as the directed “arcs” (see
Fig.2 below). The arrows show the direction of “A-envy.”
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Figure 2: Some typical envy-graphs.
A directed graph of active constraints depicts which consumer “almost-envies” which
package, designed for some other consumer. For example, the arc (1 → 2) in Fig.2(a)
means that in the related optimal plan, the IC constraint labeled as (i, k) = (1, 2) is active,
i.e., it becomes an equality, so the first consumer “A-envies” the second package. Similarly,
one can also describe a B-envy, or a LBA-envy structure using graphs.
Any directed graph induces a partial ordering (º) among its nodes, strict predecessor
being (strictly) “higher” (Â) than successors, and unconnected nodes being incomparable.
Besides, nodes can be equally high, if they belong to some circuit i º j º k º i. However,
in this paper it is sufficient to exculde circuits and consider only those profit-maximizing
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solutions where the A-envy-graph is either an “in-tree” (a “rooted” graph with a single
path to the “root” from every “node”) or an (in-)tree supplemented by “bypasses” like in
Fig.2(d) (see Brito et al.(1990) and Lemma 1 in Appendix for explanation). In particular,
a “tree” can be multi-layered like in Fig.2(a), or single-layered, i.e., a “star,” where every
node is connected to the root, as in Fig.2(b); or a “chain” (linear path), as in Fig.2(c);
or some other type (terms like “root”, “leaves” and “branches” are intuitively clear). In
contrast, Fig.2(d) shows a structure which is not a “tree,” because of “bypass.” In all such
“envy-graphs,” the “node” #0 denotes the “root” package (0,0), and the “arcs” leading
downwards are representing the IC and participation constraints. The “spanning-tree” of
any graph is a subgraph (tree), which includes all nodes of the graph. Circuits are directed
cycles (discussed in Appendix). All these notions serve as a road-map for discussing solution
structure and efficiency in non-classical situations.
Each graph in Fig.2 is supplemented with the related picture of its net-valuations profile.
Thick dots denote socially-efficient packages under full information and sometimes they
do coincide with the equilibrium packages, in the opposite case being crossed with small
lines. The hollow dots represent those equilibrium packages that are distorted, i,e., either
undersized (Fig.2(d)) or oversized (Fig.2(c)). The direction of distortion depends upon
whether the envying package is bigger or smaller in quantity than the envied one: envy
from above leads to undersizing and vice verse. So envy is “pushing,” not “pulling” the
affected package (see Proposition 1).
These four graphs show most typical outcomes for three consumers (some other graphs
are also possible). The “star” structure shown in Fig.2(b) is the simplest one. It describes
the situation when only the participation constraints are active for the menu under consid-
eration, nobody almost-envies any other package. Such a menu can be profit maximizing
when valuations-profile has the shape depicted in the right panel of Fig.1, or in the top
picture in Fig.2(b). The specific feature of the families of preferences producing a “star”
structure is that no consumer can be named as a “high-demand” consumer relative to any
other consumer. Instead, the order looks horizontal (as in the Hotelling model) and hence
it obviously violates the SMC, or even weaker assumptions of vertical ordering. The entire
package-menu here is distortion-free, because it is envy-free, showing “efficiency at-the-top”
(of each branch) and consumer surplus is zero. In contrast, a “chain” in Fig.2(c) describes
locally-vertically-ordered demands, although the direction of ordering is opposite to the
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SMC. Because of this reversal in the direction of ordering, it shows oversizing instead of
undersizing (such examples of reverse distortion are demonstrated by Srinagesh and Brad-
burd (1989)). Finally, Fig.2(a) shows a rare, or even degenerate, example of efficiency in
spite of active-B-envy and positive consumer surplus. An opposite non-typical case is shown
in Fig.2(d) that demonstrates no consumer surplus, though some distortion is still present
(the numerical calculations for these examples are available from the authors).
Now, with these intuiutive explanations, we can more clearlly pose the main question of
the paper: For any observed pricing menu, how to detect efficiency or distortion? Typically,
looking at a market, we only observe quantities and tariffs without knowing the envy-
structure, valuations functions, or even any ordering of them. These details of the situation
should be revealed, rather than assumed. We solve the inverse problem of screening: not
building an optimal menu from the known valuations, but partially restoring the valuations
from the optimal menu.
Graphically, this task means revealing the shape or at least the mutual position (order-
ing) of valuation curves from several observed points in quantity-tariff space. Naturally,
it requires assumptions restricting the class of functions to be explored, otherwise curves
cannot be revealed from points.
3. INDICATORS OF EFFICIENCY OR DISTORTION
This section presents the main theoretical results, namely the three different indicators
of efficiency or distortion. The applicability of each indicator depends on the available
information, as shown in the table.
Basis for judgement Indicator to be used Diagnosis
1. No envy envy-based (Proposition 1-i) efficiency
Envy envy-based (Proposition 1-ii) distortion
2. Same net-of-cost tariffs profit-based (Proposition 2) efficiency
3. Valuation class and approx. costs revealed envy (Theorems 1,2, distortion,
Corollary 3.2) or efficiency
We start with more simple (but rarely applicable) indicators 1 and 2, which are used to
construct our main method formulated in Theorems 1, 2 later on. For comprehending these
indicators, consider a hypothetical example where all three indicators might be applicable.
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Example 3.1: Linear city. Consider a city stretched along the riverside: the east-
and the west-ends are the two residential areas separated by a central business district.
Although aggregating many consumers into two distinct (east and west) “representative
consumer” groups is questionable, as a crude approximation it will do. Assuming a monop-
olist can locate two gasoline stations: one somewhere in the east-end, and the other in the
west of downtown, for the same cost of construction. “Quantity” or quality variables xeast,
xwest become locations in this example, gasoline prices serves as tariffs ti, while the quan-
tity of fuel needed for each representative consumer is reflected by parameters mi (as in
“product-line” literature, and in our model formulation). “Efficient” locations x∗i , i.e., the
most convenient places for the consumers, are the peaks of the two valuations on interval
[0,1] describing this linear city.
What kind of price discrimination can occur? If the east-end is very poor, then the seller
may want to set a lower price in the east-end than in the west. This may require to locate
the east station farther from the downtown than preferred by consumers (xeast > x
∗
east),
to prevent the rich west-end consumers from using it. This means quantity or quality
(in whichever way the location is named) distortion, and we can directly observe this
inefficiency on the city map, if we know which location the consumers prefer. Can we
detect distortion using some indirect information, without exactly knowing preferences? It
is our main question.
3.1. No-Envy Strcture as Indicator of Efficiency
The simplest situation of observing the absence of “A-envy” is when nobody from the
west-end buys in the east and vice versa, even under small fluctuations in prices. But does
this absence of envy really signal efficiency?
Theoretically, “efficiency-at-the-top” is the common wisdom under SMC, and the “top”
means the highest-demand consumer. In our more general setting, “tops” are the summits or
“leaves” of the envy-graph, and it is natural to expect them being efficient, since being envy-
free. Indeed, such assertions regarding efficiency without SMC can be found in Guesnerie
and Seade (1982), Brito et al. (1990), Andersson (2005). Nevertheless, we start clarifying
now this seemingly simple issue, because it still rises various misunderstandings and even
some incorrect claims (commented in footnote 9 below). The main source of confusion
is mixing “active constraints” and “binding constraints,” and thus mixing “A-envy” with
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“B-envy” (see definitions on page 7).
Proposition 1 (used for Theorems 1,2 later on) can be very roughly summarized as say-
ing that type i’s allocation will be distorted (inefficient) if and only if doing so helps the
principal by relaxing an incentive constraint. Proposition 1 clarifies all previous assertions
regarding envy and efficiency-at-the-top without SMC, and adds a reverse claim on ineffi-
ciency below the top, while Appendix supplements the proposition with counter-examples,
to finally complete this topic. For this we need three alternative assumptions about the
equilibrium menu (x¯, T¯ ) and one its component, package (x¯i0 , T¯i0) tested for efficiency.
Assumption B: The package (x¯i0 , T¯i0) is free of B-envy from any other consumer, i.e.,
all IC constraints related to i0 can be dropped without altering the solution (i.e., j 699K i0
∀j).
Assumption A + C: Net valuations vj(.) = Vj(.)− C(.) are concave, and either
the package (x¯i0 , T¯i0) is free of A-envy from any consumer with a distinct package, i.e.,
Vj(x¯j) − T¯j > Vj(x¯i0) − T¯i0 for all j : xj 6= xi0 (i.e., j 6→ i0 ∀j : xj 6= xi0), or package
(x¯i0 , T¯i0) is free of LBA-envy (i.e., j 6⇒ i0 ∀j 6= i0).
Assumption LBA + C: Net valuations vi are strictly concave and differentiable,
package (x¯j0 , T¯j0) experiences LBA-envy from a single consumer k, (∃!k : k ⇒ j0), and this
package k is distinct: x¯k 6= x¯j0 (LBA means a positive Lagrangian multiplier λkj0 > 0, the
Kuhn-Tucker theorem is assumed to be applicable and the multipliers assumed existing).
Under the above assumptions, the necessary conditions and the sufficient conditions for
package efficiency are stated below.
Proposition 1:9 Take an equilibrium menu (x¯, T¯ ). (i) When (A + C) or/and (B)
assumptions hold for a package (x¯i0 , T¯i0), then quantity x¯i0 is undistorted (efficient) for all
agents taking this package. Conversely, (ii) When assumption LBA+C holds for a package
9 Our claim (i)-(A+C) can be compared with similar Proposition 2-ii in Guesnerie and Seade
(1982), differing in assumptions of linear cost and a general monotone, strictly concave differen-
tiable utility function u(x, t). However, the concavity assumption was not used in their proof,
misleading Brito et al. (1990) to drop concavity (when generalizing this claim for many com-
modities) in their incorrect Proposition 3, repeated as incorrect Lemma 3 in Andersson (2005)
also. All three papers underestimate concavity assumption because not noticing the difference
between active and binding constraints (see the counter-example A.1 in the Appendix, page 33).
Our Proposition 1 correctly generalizes the result in Guesnerie and Seade for non-linear costs
and weaker conditions on V (.). It adds B-version of claim (i), and gives a new reverse claim
(ii), adding also the elaborated graph language. An additional generalization of Proposition 1 to
non-quasi-linear multidimensional utilities is discussed in the Appendix.
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(x¯j0 , T¯j0), then x¯j0 is distorted (inefficient). In particular, higher quantity for the envying
agent k ( x¯k > x¯j0 , k ⇒ j0) means that x¯j0 is undersized, while the opposite ( x¯k < x¯j0 , k ⇒
j0) implies oversized x¯j0 .
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Corollary 2.1: Under concave net valuations, the graph of active constraints being
a “star” is sufficient for overall efficiency .
All the proofs are in Appendix.
Remarks: The essence of Proposition 1(i-B) is that when a constraint is not binding
the profit function, then it is not binding the related net-valuation function as well, as
illustrated in Fig.1(b) (page 9) and Fig.2(b) (page 10). So, the absence of B-envy is sufficient
for efficiency without additional conditions. However, it is not the case for the claim related
to A-envy (Proposition 1(i-AC)). Indeed, Example A.1 (page 33) in the Appendix clearly
shows the need for concavity or strict quasi-concavity assumption (see footnote 9).
For claim (ii), which gives the necessary condition for efficiency, the need for all as-
sumptions is also supported by counter-examples. First, neither A-envy, nor B-envy or
their combination can replace LBA-envy (Example A2, Fig.4(b), page 35). And most im-
portantly, the “single envying person” assumption or something of the kind is also needed,
as shown by the example in Fig. 2(a), page 10. Here, in spite of LBA-envy, special counter-
vailing effect makes package #2 non-distorted, because agents #1 and #3 “push” package
#2 in the opposite directions — #1 pushes it to the right and #3 to the left. When these
countervailing forces are equal, package #2 can be efficient (like #1 and #3), even though
the graph is not a “star.” The needed condition for such strange countervailing effect is
that the derivatives of valuations at the efficient point xˇ2 (argmaximum of v2) satisfy the
equality m1v˙1(xˇ2) + m3v˙3(xˇ2) = 0 (see proof of Proposition 1 for explanation, denoting
further v˙i(z) :=
d
dz
vi(z)). Clearly, this equality does not follow from profit maximization
itself, so almost-all small variations in data preclude such efficiency examples, thus making
them degenerate. Therefore, envy “normally” yields distortion.11
Based on the above considerations, we can informally state something like a reverse
claim to Corollary 2.1. Intuitively, the star-structure of all A-, B-, and LBA-envy graphs is
generically (though not always!) the necessary condition of overall efficiency under concave
10 Compare our claim (ii) to the two possible directions of distortion (over- and undersizing)
proved in Srinagesh and Bradburd (1989) under relaxed SMC.
11 Instead of “single envying person,” a more realistic and reasonable assumption on valuations
to preclude such equalities at the equilibrium is to consider only generic situations.
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valuations. That is, generically under efficiency each (A, B, and LBA) envy-graph is a star,
i.e., only the participation constraints “matter.”
To apply Proposition 1 in real life situations, one should observe “no-envy” from ei-
ther survey questionnaires or some other similar information sources. “No-envy” can be
revealed when the chosen package is any consumer’s deliberate choice over all other pack-
ages, independent of small changes in price. For example, if a small tube of toothpaste
is preferred for short travels and a bigger tube is used for home by everybody regardless
of some changes in prices, it means “no-envy” (recall that a consumer bying again is a
new consumer here). As stated earlier, in the linear-city example, the absence of envy and
efficiency can be assured without questionnaires when no one from the west-end ever goes
to the east-end specifically for buying gasoline, and vice-versa.
Now we can make some comparisons. Notice that such examples of horizontally ordered
product-line or “star-graph” cases of second-degree price discrimination are rather similar
to the first-degree or the third-degree price discriminations (though the latter is usually
inefficient because of linear pricing). The main difference is that because the consumers
under screening are segmented voluntarily, market segmentation is no longer an equilibrium
prerequisite as in third-degree price discrimination, but an equilibrium outcome. The same
goes for horizontal ordering: it is an outcome, not an assumption here. Putting it differently,
the preferences family can be named horizontal only in cases of star-graph of solution.
Graphically, “horizontal” prefernces profile means that each net valuation has its peak
not below any other net-valuation curve, as in Fig.1(b) (page 9) and Fig.2(b) (page 10).
Based on these pictures, we argue below that “horizontal” examples are non-degenerate,
and moreover, there is no reason to suppose “vertically-ordered” families of preference being
more common in reality than “horizontal,” or some other families.
For the cases when “no-envy” information is hardly available we turn to other criteria.
3.2. Similar Profits Per-package as Indicator of Efficiency
Now consider another indicator of efficiency based on profit per package (thus, requiring
costs information). Essentially, when one observes equal profits from each package, it
indicates “no-envy” and hence overall efficiency of the equilibrium menu. Moreover, the
correspondence between profit level and envy-graph layer of any package is monotone. To
use these known results in Sections 3.3 and 4, we extend and reformulate them now in our
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terms (recall, that net-tariffs or profits per package are defined as tj = Tj −C(xj) and the
total profit is their weighted sum).
Proposition 2: Take an equilibrium menu (x¯, T¯ ). (i)12 A consumer i bringing higher
per-package profit than some other consumer j ( t¯i > t¯j) cannot be lower than j in the
A-envy graph, i.e., j 6Â i: consumer i is free of A-envy from j (Vj(x¯j)− T¯j > Vj(x¯i)− T¯i).
(ii)[Brito et al. (1990), Proposition 4] The highest-profit package is undistorted, and if
all packages bring the same profits t¯j = t¯i ∀i, j, then they are all undistorted (efficient).
Remark: (i) Similar monotone correspondence between profit level and envy level need
not hold for a B-envy graph, see Example A.3 in the Appendix. (ii) It follows from the
Proposition that an efficient package must exist in the equilibrium menu.
But why should an overall-efficient menu exist? Postponing real-life examples to Section
4, see now illustrations in Fig.1(b) (page 9) and Fig.2(b) (page 10). They clearly show why
profit-maximizing socially efficient outcomes are non-degenerate. Indeed, one can slightly
modify valuations and costs in any direction and still efficiency would be maintained, so,
there is a continuum of overall-efficient situations. Indeed, overall-efficiency is guaranteed
whenever each curve Vi keeps its tangency point (x¯i, T¯ i) not below the other curve. In terms
of the middle graph in Fig.1(b), it is the case when two demands cross and the areas of the
two consumer-surplus triangles (net-of-cost demands) are more-or-less equal, depicted by
similarly high peaks (x¯i, t¯i) of net valuations vi in the bottom graph.
Therefore Proposition 2(ii) can be informally extended as follows: “When all packages
give approximately the same profits, then they are efficient” (a formal proposition like this
in ε and δ terms is proved but not included, see also Fig.3 below).
To interpret this indicator, consider once again the linear-city example. Suppose, we
now observe that gasoline prices (which serve as tariffs for the two locations) are “sufficiently
close,” and the cost of providing gasoline for the firm is approximately the same at both
the locations. Then such pricing, which is almost non-discriminatory, is efficient in this
market. But can we rigorously define what is “sufficiently close,” to extend this criterion?
This requires restricting the class of the valuation functions.
We develop this idea now to construct a new third criterion of efficiency, which is most
12 Guesnerie and Seade (1982) state similar fact within the proof of Proposition 3: the envying
agent brings higher profit than the envied one. Brito et al. (1990) in Proposition 1, and Andersson
(2005) in Proposition 2 also make similar statement. Our formulation adds graph terms and
extends this claim to non-adjacent couples i, j, including incomparable ones (i, j : i 6º j, j 6º i).
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useful, because net-tariffs can be considerably different and information on envy is rarely
observable.
3.3. Observed Tariffs and Quantities as Indicators of Efficiency and Distortion
3.3.1. Parameterized Demands and Main Criterion
Assume full information on tariffs, quantities and costs is available, and assume a para-
meterized class of demand functions that approximates real demands of several consumer
groups. For instance, this class may be linear or hyperbolic functions. Our goal is to reveal
the efficient or distorted nature of the observed package menu, together with valuations
parameters or at least their ordering.
To accomplish this task, the assumed class of demand functions should not be too
broad. Naturally, to reveal the hidden individualized demand parameters from only two
observable variables, namely quantities and tariffs, it is important that the number of
demand parameters revealed should not exceed two. This is the main restriction on the
demand class that we adopt.
More specifically, we take a parameterized family of net-of-cost valuation functions
satisfying the following restrictions:
vi(z) = hiW (z, di), z ∈ R, (4)
W (0, di) = 0, W (·) is concave,
max
z
W (z, di) = 1, it is attained at z = di. (5)
Here parameter hi = maxz∈R vi(z) denotes the height of the peak of individual net-
valuation function vi(·), i.e., the maximum possible net-tariff from this consumer (maximal
joint consumer and producer welfare), and di = argmaxz vi(z) is the distance from the
origin to this peak on the abscissa, or the efficient quantity. Up to our opinion, maximal
welfare and efficient quantity are the two main parameters of any demand function, to be
revealed from observing quantites x and tariffs T . The class-function W (·) defines some
pre-determined shape of valuation functions that the investigator chooses, for some reasons,
to approximate the data.
For instance, one can approximate the net-of-cost inverse demand with the hyperbolic
function P (z, d) = 2d
z+d
− 1, (for a normalized unit cost c = 1), then the normalized net
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valuation is W (z, d) = 2d ln(z+d)−z−2d ln d
2d ln(2d)−d−2d ln d , that satisfies the above requirements. Another
appropriate possibility that we have studied is the general power functions P (z, d) = β(z+
d)γ − α (γ > 0, α > 0). We mention it to argue that our assumption of “similar-shape”
demands is not too restrictive. For various hi, di, W (.) one can get sufficiently broad family
of demands to approximate any real market.
We prove now main Theorem 1 with no-envy or efficiency criterion (6), valid for arbitrary
function W , and later on specify the criterion for linear demands.
Theorem 1: Assume parameterized valuations as in (4)-(5) and some observed profit-
maximizing package menu ( x¯, T¯ ). Assume package i is B-envy-free or efficient for some
other reasons. Then the A-envy criterion is (6):
i 6→ j ⇔ W (x¯j, x¯i) < t¯j + s¯ii
t¯i + s¯ii
, where t¯i = T¯i − c(x¯i), (6)
s¯ij = vi(x¯j)− t¯j is i-th consumer surplus under (x¯j, t¯j). (7)
If j is also not B-envied by any third package k 6= i, then inequality W (x¯j, x¯i) < t¯j+s¯iit¯i+s¯ii
is sufficient for efficient (non-distorted) quantity x¯j; and it is generically necessary, when
number of types is restricted as m ≤ 3.13 “Generically” means that among continuum of
situations with any non-atomic distribution of valuation parameters dj or/and hj on R++
, with probability 1 this equality W (x¯j, x¯i) =
t¯j+s¯ii
t¯i+s¯ii
observed at solution, signals distorted
quantity: x¯j 6= dj.14
Proof: The incentive-compatibility constraint (i, j) as strict inequality (absence of
A-envy: i 6→ j) takes the form:
s¯ii = vi(x¯i)− t¯i = hiW (x¯i, di)− t¯i > hiW (x¯j, di)− t¯j = s¯ij.
Since we have assumed efficient quantity x¯i = di (efficiency of i follows from no-B-
envy assumption by Proposition 1), so W (x¯i, di) = 1, s¯ii = hi − t¯i, and W (x¯j, x¯i) <
t¯j+s¯ii
hi
. By substituting hi, our strict incentive compatibility constraint can be equivalently
reformulated as (6). Efficiency of j follows from (i 6→ j) by Proposition 1.
As to generic necessity, suppose equality W (x¯j, x¯i) =
t¯j+s¯ii
t¯i+s¯ii
holding but equilibrium
13The reversed inequalityW (x¯j , x¯i) >
t¯j+s¯ii
t¯i+s¯ii
means violated incentive constraint, i.e., model inconsistent
with observation (x¯, t¯). Condition m ≤ 3 is not a crucial but a technical one, to avoid long proof through
Proposition 2 and LBA property.
14Here defining what is “generic,” we suppose parameters of other consumers fixed, when varying these
(dj , hj). Yet, varying other parameters also should give the same result.
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quantity x¯j = dj being efficient (as well as x¯i = di). We should prove that for any pertur-
bation ε 6= 0 of valuation parameter dεj = dj + ε (proof for parameter hj is similar, using
strict concavity) either this equality or efficiency of xεj , x
ε
i becomes violated at related equi-
librium (xε, tε). We can do it by deriving the closed-form solution (xε, tε) for any plausible
envy-graph. Using Lemma 1 from Appendix, the only 4 cases of solution structures to be
explored under these assumptions are (let i = #1, j = #2, k = #3,):
[(i) #3 independent: 0← #1→ #2→ 0,#3→ 0],
[(ii) #3 envied by both: #3← #1→ #2→ #3→ 0],
[(iii) #3 envied by #2: 0← #1→ #2→ #3→ 0],
[(iv) #3 envied by #1: 0← #2← #1→ #3→ 0].
Due to efficiency hypothesis x¯j = dj (j = 1, 2). In case (i) both surpluses are s11 = 0 =
s22. So, W (x¯2, x¯1) = W (d2, d1) =
t¯2
t¯1
= h2
h1
6= W (dε2, d1) ∀ε 6= 0, i.e., the equality cannot
remain true when parameters h2, h1, d1 remains the same, but d2 changes. Only one value
of dε2, namely, d2 satisfies the needed equality among non-atomically (say, continuously)
distrbuted parameters dε2, so probability of the equality is zero. Geometrically, it means
that two valuation curves going from (0,0) can intersect exactly at the peak of the lower
curve v2, but probability of this event is zero. In case (iii) again s¯11 = 0, and the same
logic apply, only curve v2 is going now from (x¯3, t¯3), instead of (0,0), algebra is the same.
Geometrically quite similar are the remaining two cases. In case (ii) both curves go from
point (x¯ε3, t¯
ε
3), and though this point does depend upon parameter ε, the named coincidence
of the peak and the intersection is still zero. In case (iv) curve v1 goes from point (x¯3, t¯3)
independent of ε, so its position is independent of ε, while curve v2 goes from point (0, 0),
its peak (dε2, h2) and its intersection with v1 both being dependent upon ε. Using strict
concavity of v2, the probabilty of coincidence of the peak and the intersection with a fixed
curve is again zero, that was or goal. ¤
Corollary 3.1. Under parameterized valuations, if any two packages i, j are B-envy-
free from any other packages and have zero consumer surpluses (or the menu consists of
i, j only), then for i, j to be A,B-envy-free from each other (disconnected) and efficient, it
is sufficient (and generically necessary) that inequality hold :
W (xi, xj) <
ti
tj
<
1
W (xj, xi)
. (8)
This remarkably simple and practical symmetric formula obviously follows from the
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above theorem by setting zero consumer surpluses. These are necessarily zero when there
are only two envy-disconnected packages in the menu, obviously. (both directions??)
3.3.2. Two Linear Demands and Variety of Possible Outcomes
Let us illustrate this parametric-demands approach and the resulting Theorem, for the
most convenient case: linear demands. As a by-product, we demonstrate that all logicaly
plausible graphs of envy are really generated as screening solutions under varying hi, di.
Example 3.2: Two linear demands. Comparative statics, showing all possible solution
structures, and graphical criterion of (in-)efficiency.
Fig.1 (page 9, di = xi, hi = ti) have shown one example of linear demands, while
Fig.3(a) presents complete comparative statics for the entire family of two such demands
and shows how solution envy-structures and (in-)efficiency change with shifts in demand
parameters di, hi. Seven parameter regions show six theoretically possible envy-graphs,
and distinction between ordered/non-ordered valuations.15
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Figure 3: Efficiency, over-, or under-sizing for 2 linear demands.
In the figure, the triangles represent the net-of-cost individual demands, i.e., the ad-
15 This example relies on the formulas derived in Nahata, Kokovin and Zhelobodko (2002).
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missible profits per package, and a1 and a2 denote the heights of the two triangles. The
lengths d1 and d2 of the triangles are the efficient quantities, so hi = aidi/2 is the area of
the triangle. The figure normalizes both parameters of the first triangle to 1 (a1 = 1 = d1)
and shows comparative statics only w.r.t. a2 and d2. Consumers are numbered so that #1
has a higher height: a1 > a2 and m1/m2 = 2 in this example. When the related length
is also larger, d1 > d2, then it is vertically-ordered situation (SMC), shown by the regions
A and C of two parameters α = a2/a1, δ = d2/d1. When d2 > d1 then valuations appear
non-ordered and various related solution structures are depicted by five regions B, D, E,
F, and G. In addition, each region shows its specific envy-graph and the related typical
demand triangle.
Observe that generally the longer the second triangle, the bigger is the related region’s
number, from A, B to G (though height a2 also matters in this sequence, and region C drops
out, since small-demand consumer is unserved). One can notice some regularity in the
changing envy-graphs when going counter-clockwise from B to G, as d2 and/or a2 increase.
The region E relates to efficient combinations of parameters a2/a1, and d2/d1 (this region’s
bounds are derived as: 2− d2/d1 ≤ a2/a1 ≤ 1/(2− d1/d2). Here the triangles of admissible
profit are approximately equal in areas. Therefore, the same-profit curve (dotted) a2/a1 =
d1/d2 looks like a “bisector” of this efficiency region E, thus illustrating Proposition 2 and
related comments on generic efficiency. The regions F and G of undersizing lie above E,
while the regions D and B of oversizing lie below. The main conclusion is that each type
of equilibrium is a non-degenerate case (as argued for region E in Section 3.2).
Now consider Fig.3(b) (page 22), where the use of inequality (8) is illustrated with the
same linear demands example (though this inequality can work also under any non-linear
valuations given by W ).
Fig.3(b) depicts several parameter regions similar to Fig.3(a), but in terms of observable
values, which are quantities xi and net tariffs (per-package profits) ti. Here, in contrast
with the left panel, the consumers are numbered not by the relative heights, but by the
lengths of the triangles. The agent with a smaller-size package (xs, ts) is s, and one with the
larger size (xl, tl) is l, where xl ≥ xs, but tl ≥ ts is not guaranteed. With this renumbering,
the ordered-demand region A can hardly be distinguished from region G (they are very
similar, because in G, the small upper part of higher triangle does not make any significant
difference). One can see that the regions in the right panel almost mirror the left one,
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but for the direction of circling around the pivot-point (1,1), and the disappearance of the
region C, related to serving only one type of consumers.
Like in the left panel, the efficiency region E is situated between the regions of oversizing
and undersizing. Its borders can be derived from formula (8) as 2b−b2 ≤ ts/tb ≤ b22b−1 , where
b = xs/xl is the abscissa.The dotted same-profit curve in the left panel gets transformed
into the dotted same-profit line in the right panel. In both panels this curve or line looks
like a “bisector” of the region E, again confirming Proposition 2.
Thus, for the simplest diagnosis of efficiency/distortion under two linear demands, when
costs are observable, it is sufficient to place the point given by ratios (xs/xl, ts/tl) onto
Fig.3(b) and read the outcome.
In particular, when this point of ratios (approximately) lie on the same-net-tariff line,
it is the efficient case. Besides, the entire upper-left quarter of the right panel is efficient.
It means that observing the same or a larger net-tariff for the smaller package (ts/tl ≥ 1)
necessarily indicates efficiency, provided the size of the bigger package is at least twice as
large as the size of the smaller one (xl/xs ≥ 2). In the upper-right quarter we either detect
efficiency or oversizing, but undersizing is definitely ruled out. In the two lower quarters
we distinguish undersizing from efficiency with the help of curve W (.). Line [(0,0),(1,1)]
distinguishes ordered from non-ordered preferences.
Similar graphical criterion works for an arbitrary non-quadratic function W (.), using
formula (8). One can realize that geometry remains the same as for quadratic function
depicted in Fig.3(b). After normalizing xl = 1, the lower border of efficiency region E
would be the curve W (xs, 1) itself. It anyway originates from (0,0) and goes to (1,1), while
the upper border 1/W (1, xs) goes down from infinity to (1,1), for any admissible W .
3.3.3. Diagnosis for Several Linear Demands with Roughly Estimated Costs
Our goal now is to transform Theorem 1 and formula (8) for convenient practical ap-
plication in situations with vague knowledge of costs. It is easier to do for linear demands
(i.e., quadratic valuations) and linear cost C(x) = c0 + cx (that may include a fixed per-
package cost component c0 ≥ 0 and marginal cost c ≥ 0). The below theorem essentially
says that for efficiency conclusion, the package prices observed should lie within certain
bounds depending on costs; in particular, quantity discount should not be too small.
Recall that “i A-envies j” (i→ j) means active incentive-compatibility constraint (i, j)
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(see envy definitions on page 7).
Theorem 2:16 Under linear demands and linear cost, assume that a profit-maximizing
package menu ( x¯, T¯ ) has a package i free of B-envy from any other consumer ( k 699K i ∀k),
or efficient for other reasons. Then the criterion for no-A-envy can be formulated as (6):
i 6→ j ⇔ 2− x¯j
x¯i
<
pj − c+ s¯ii/x¯j
pi − c+ s¯ii/x¯i ⇔
17 (9)
⇔ x¯i
(2− x¯j
x¯i
)(pi − c)− (pj − c)
( x¯i
x¯j
+
x¯j
x¯i
− 2) < s¯ii ⇔(when s¯ii=0) (10)
p¯j − p¯i > (p¯i − c)(1− x¯j
x¯i
), where pk = T¯k/x¯k is per-unit price, (11)
s¯ik = Vi(x¯k)− T¯k is i-th consumer surplus under (x¯k, T¯k). (12)
If j is also not B-envied by any third package k 6= i, then inequality (9) is sufficient for
efficient (non-distorted) quantity x¯j; and it is generically necessary, when number of types
is restricted as m ≤ 3.18
Proof: This theorem is derived from Theorem 1 just by substituting the assumed
quadratic valuation W (z, di) = 2z/di − z2/d2i , with simple algebraic transformations. ¤
Notice, that under zero consumer surplus the criterion obtained just compares propor-
tion of trade margins to proportion of quantities subtracted from 2.
For definite efficiency conclusion under vague knowledge of cost, the no-envy inequality
must hold for the whole interval of plausible costs c.
In many (though not all) cases, in spite of unclear costs, these results and ideas en-
able to completely reveal the solution envy-graph from observations! It is done through
the Efficiency-Revelation Algorithm (formulated for linear demands, but generalizible), as
follows.
Efficiency-Revelation Algorithm
16 Oversizing statement in Srinagesh and Bradburd (1988) is somewhat similar to the related
part of this corollary. However, we consider the case of n consumers without any ordering as-
sumptions, give necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency, and at the same time formulate
them in terms of observable variables.
18 Observation of strict reverse inequality to relation (9) under zero consumer surplus means
violation of incentive compatibility, i.e., assumptions of the model appear inadequate. As to
direction of distortion, by Proposition 1, LBA-envy from the left side (x¯i < x¯j0) indicates that
x¯j0 is oversized, while the opposite implies undersized x¯j0 .
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(Step 1) For any admissible cost c, start from the most profitable package i1 which
is envy-free and efficient by Proposition 2, so criterion (9) is applicable to i1. In many
cases, ordering of per-package profits remains the same on the whole admissible cost in-
terval [cmin, cmax], otherwise revelation goes on its ordering-preserving subintervals, not on
particular c. Suppose zero surplus for i1 (si1i1 = 0) and check inequality (11) for all j (with
lower profits).
Case (1-i). If all couples (i1, j), j 6= i1 (further denoted as i = i1) satisfy inequality
(11) for all admissible c, then each j is A-envy-free from i and even A-envy-disconnected
from i (since A-envy j → i from lower-profit packages upwards inexist). Then, zero-surplus
hypothesis (sii = 0) is confirmed as consistent with data, because the only constraint
restricting ti from above can be the participation one. Graphically, this case means that
for each admissible c under (sii = 0) hypothesis we have relealed both parameters of the
net-valuation parabola vi(xi) = hi(2xi/di−x2i /d2i ) coming through points (0, 0) and (x¯i, t¯i),
as di = x¯i and hi = ti = Ti − cx¯i, and that no other package (x¯j, t¯j) lies beneath this
parabola. The opposite hypothesis (sii > 0) cannot be confirmed under the same c when
sii = 0 is confirmed, because inequality (10) should turn into equality at some j when
sii > 0.
19 Thus, using inequality (11) we have found no A-envy, i.e., i 6→ j ∀j.
Case (1-ii). Suppose, some packages j 6= i violate inequality (11) for some given ad-
missible c, so one or more incentive constraints are active. To select among several, the
related surplus sii(c) = sij(c) can be calculated by formula (10) taken as equation. Ob-
viously, true surplus s¯ii(c) is the maximum among such values (among n − 1 equations),
i.e., s¯ii = maxj 6=i sij, where sij denotes left-hand side of (10). Violated (11) means surplus
s¯ii > 0, so all argmaxima j¯ = argmaxj 6=i sij are revealed as the packages A-envied by i
under this cost c (if argmaximum j¯ is unique, this j¯ is even LBA-envied: i ⇒ j¯). If it
happens that for all admissible c such j¯ is the same, then A-envy to this package i →
j¯ is revealed with certainty everywhere. Otherwise we report some ambiguity, find the
sub-intervals of [cmin, cmax] yielding A-envy, and probability of the constraint i → j¯ being
19Geometric, more intuitive, proof: the opposite hypothesis (sii > 0) cannot be confirmed when (sii = 0)
is confirmed, because higher sii gives higher hi = ti + sii, that means more narrow parabola vi having the
same summit (x¯i, t¯i) and starting not from (0,0) but from a lower point (0,−sii). If any package (x¯j , t¯j)
lies above the broad parabola, then it also lies above the narrow parabola, whose under-graph is included
into the broad under-graph. So hypothesis sii > 0 fails.
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active (using some assumption on cost disribution on [cmin, cmax], see Table 1 below).
(Step 2) Take the second-best-profitable package i2 and repeat the same investigation
of Step 1 as with #1.
(Case-i) In case when i2 is already known to be A-envy-free from i1 (while it is A-envy-
free from lower packages by Proposition 2), by Proposition 1(i-A) this i2 is efficient, so
criterion (9) is applicable to i2.
If checking (9) we reveal no-envy from i2 downwards, study the third-best package i3
similarly, and so on, recursively, until exhausting the packages list. If inequality (11) holds
every time, this induction arrives at the efficient star-structure. In the opposite case, we
detect some envy at some stage, and find intervals of cost c yeilding A-envy and probability
of this event.
(Case-ii) When detecting any package ik as being A-envied (and probably inefficient),
criterion (9) is non-applicable, so it is not easy to check envy or no-envy from ik downwards
(to lower-profit packages). It may require knowledge of relative frequences mi of consumer
types, to build graph-specific objective function pi(xi, xj), use the first-order conditions as
equations w.r.t. dj, hj, and reveal parabola parameters dj, hj (this case and method goes
beyond the scope of this paper). ||
In Table 1 below we see that this recursive algorithm works easily when it detects an
efficient star-graph (one layer). It also detects well any two-layered graphs, and the better
is information on costs – the less ambiguity remains. But multi-layered graphs are not easy
to reveal, they require further developement of this technique.
By exploiting this algorithm we arrive at the following useful corollary about star-graph
case.
Corollary 3.2.20 Under the conditions of Theorem 2, for all packages to be A-envy-
disconnected from each other (i.e., i 6→ j ∀i, j), it is necessary and sufficient that inequality
(11) (i.e., 2 − x¯j
x¯i
<
pj−c
pi−c ) holds for each couple of agents i, j. This inequality for all also
implies social efficiency for all and zero consumer surplus for all.
In the following section, we demonstrate the practical use of the above theory, mainly
exploiting the efficiency-revelation algorithm and Corollary 3.2. on whole intervals of ad-
20This “mutual-no-envy” criterion is also generalizible from totall packages list N to any subgoup G ⊂ N
of packages, B-envy free from the reminder of N . But this B-envy condition is hard to check, so usage of
this generalization is unclear.
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missible costs.
4. PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF CRITERIA
4.1 General Methodological Considerations and Difficulties
Turning now to empirical application of our (in-)efficiency criteria, we start with hints
and warnings about handling the data.
1. Quantity and satiability. As mentioned above, the size xi of a package should be
treated as quality or convenience parameter, not as the quantity per period. This explains
non-vertically-ordered valuations, demand satiation, and why the tariffs could be the same
for different sizes. Say, different Coca-Cola containers can be sold for the same price, when
some consumers find it inconvenient to gulp from a bigger bottle while walking on the street
or driving a car. Similar satiation from package size (not from the product itself) can also
result from storage costs (see Gerstner and Hess (1987)).
2. Distinct consumer types. To explain what is “consumer type” in reality, take the
example of rice packages in Japan, given in Table 1. Probably, the occasional consumers
of rice (say, short-term visitors in a city) find it more convenient to buy a 2-kg package,
while families more often prefer a bigger 5-kg package. When intermediate consumers
are not numerous, then the researcher can suppose that there are two distinct groups of
consumers. It can be the case for beverages, when one group drinks while driving or
walking (smaller bottles), and the other consumes at home (bigger bottles). Otherwise, for
essentially continuous distribution of consumers served yet with a discrete packages, more
rigorous approach would be to build a new screening model, lacking so far in the literature.
3. Linearity of demand and costs. Our quadratic valuations can be viewed as the ap-
proximation of actual valuations, reminding Taylor decomposition. The possible extension
of this approach is to include also the third derivative as a third parameter of the demands
family (curvature). Assuming some probability distribution for this parameter can give
estimates of probability of efficiency, instead of “yes” or “no” conclusions achieved below
under linearity restriction.
Another topic is how to measure quality. For example, for product line like business
class and economy class in an airplane there is no natural parameter to measure quality or
quantity x. In such cases cost per package should be the measure of quality, in accordance
with our cost-linearity assumption. Then our method is applicable.
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As to costs, to obtain data on costs per packages like foods and drinks, one can can take
the wholesale prices. Besides, prices net of typical trade margins are the rough proxies of
costs (we use this approach in Table 1 below). Under related uncertainty of data, to infer
efficiency by Theorem 2, inequality (11) must hold for all empirically admissible costs c,
that is not the case always, so some ambiguity may remain (see Table 1).
There is also some difficulty in handling costs, arising from our inability to separate
fixed costs per-package from the marginal cost of increasing the size of a package, which is
denoted by our c. For instance, in the analysis of Coca-Cola below, it may be erroneous
to assume the cost of an additional milliliter to be proportional to the cost of the bottle.
Instead, it may be the case that the cost of storing a bottle of 300ml or 500ml in the
vending machine is the same, and for the seller storing is more important than the cost of
the liquid itself. In this case, the same tariffs for both bottles mean same profits, being just
a simple signal of efficiency according to Proposition 2. Then our “oversizing” conclusion
in Table 1 below may be questionable.
4. “Equal” magnitudes and generic situations. In Theorem 2-(ii) A-envy is detected
when the equality holds instead of inequality. However, real data hardly can satisfy strict
equalities. Therefore, somehow the investigator should decide on how close the two observed
magnitudes must be to percept them as “equal.” Instead, in Table 1 we just show the
difference between the two “equal” values as the percentage of the admissible interval.
Further, working with data we should assume generic situation, i.e., no coincidences.
Therefore any envy observed is interpreted as the sign of distortion (see Proposition 1 and
related comments). In empirics there should be no distinction between LBA-envy and
A-envy.
5. Contradictions and inadequate model. It can happen that actual data contradict any
interpretation based on our linear-demands model, as it is the case with the last example
of Table 1 (explained in comments to the table). Then one probable alternative is to try
different demand shapes as explained in item 3 above. If it does not help, the probable
reason could be that the other assumptions of the model are inadequate, like monopolistic
position of the seller, or complex relations between the producer and the retailer in choosing
the sizes and the prices of packages. Besides, the actual types of consumers can be too
“fuzzy” to be assumed distinct, as discussed already. Our model requires modification in
all such cases to become applicable.
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4. 2. Explanation of Methodology through Example
With the above caveats, we now demonstrate the detection of efficiency or distortion
by using Theorem 2 and Corollary 3.2, on some pricing data collected by the authors in
supermarkets in the US, Japan and Russia (in 2005), see Table 1 on page 30.
Columns 1–3 of Table 1 show the raw data: the observed tariffs, package sizes, per-unit
prices, and some reasonable “empirical” upper and lower bounds on costs. These bounds
are estimated based on hypothethis of at least 10% (for upper bound cmax) and at most
100% (for lower bound cmin) profit margin for the package with the lowest average price.
The “most probable” trade margin is assumed equal to 25%, and related “most probable
cost” cmode is shown within the left and right bounds in column 1. Therefore, this value
cmode of cost is assumed to be the peak (mode) of triangular density of cost distribution
having support [cmin,cmax].
Column #4 shows some lower and upper bounds tjmin, tjmax on net-tariffs or profits
tj(c) = Tj − cxj, which are calculated from [cmin,cmax], and the ordering among profits
per-packages. In many cases the ordering is the same on the whole interval [cmin,cmax], in
opposite case we show intervals where certain ordering holds, or only indicate the proba-
bility that it holds (when probability is approximately 1). This ordering confirms absence
of envy-links “upwards” by Proposition 2, without linear-demand hypothesis.
Using data from columns #1–4, in columns #5,6,7 we check all plausible envy-links,
and (∗) means no-envy. Namely, we calculate the values of marginal cost c¯ij, turning the
(i, j)-th incentive constraint (11) into equality, and write this numbers c¯ij with the sign
(c > c¯ij or c < c¯ij) required by Theorem 2 and Corollary 3.2 for no-envy i 6→ j. Further,
these “theoretical” costs c¯ij are compared with the “empirical” cost interval [cmin,cmax]
from column 1. If whole this interval satisfies all inequalities in columns #5,6,7, then the
package under consideration, say a row j = S of the table, is diagnosed in column #8 as
definitely “envy-free” from columns L,M and efficient (provided the efficiency condition of
Theorem 2 is satisfied for profits-comparison reason, or all rows satisfy Corollary 3.2).
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Table 1. Examples of Efficient or Distorted Packages
Product, Size Tariff Ti, Profit ti(c) No-envy of (column i) to (raw j) detected if: Diagnosis of
Approx. cost xi Price p¯i per package S6→j when M6→j when L 6→j when efficiency
1. Sandwich (US) S: 6 in $3.29, 0.55 $1<ts(c)<tl(c)| c<.28 − c>cls=0.15∗ No envy Eff. S
0.20<c≈0.33<0.38 L: 12 in $4.99, 0.42 $3>ts(c)>tl(c)| c>.28 c<0.42∗ − No envy Eff. L
2. Coca-Cola (US) S: 0.47 l $1.29, 2.7 $1.01<ts(c) > tl(c)∀c − c >-0.59∗ c>-2.1∗ No envy Eff. S
M: 1.0 l $1.59, 1.6 µ[tm(c)>ts(c)]= 0.99 c<1.7
∗ − c>-1.25∗ No envy Eff. M
0.32<c≈0.52<0.59 L: 2.0 l $1.29, 0.65 $1.27>tm(c)>tl(c)∀c c<2.1
∗
c<0.65∗ − No envy Eff. L
3. Evian water S: 300 ml U107, 0.36 U73<ts(c)<tm(c)∀c − c>0.03∗ c>-0.16∗ No envy Eff. S
(Japan) M: 500 ml U131, 0.26 U99>tm(c)>tl(c)∀c c<0.21∗ − c>-0.08∗ No envy Eff. M
0.063<c≈0.1<0.11 L: 1500ml U188, 0.13 µ[tl(c)<ts(c)]= 0.98 c<0.30∗ c<0.19∗ − No envy Eff. L
4. Coca-Cola (Japan) S: 300 ml U120, 0.40 U55<ts(c)<84 − c>-0.16∗ No envy Eff. S
0.12<c≈0.19 <0.22 L: 500 ml U120, 0.24 U10<tl(c)<ts(c)∀c c< 0.16no? − S→0.77L Ov.?
5. Milk S: 200 ml U81, 0.405 µ[ts(c)<tl(c)]= 0.95 − c>0.04∗? c>0.05∗ M 6→?S Eff? S
(Japan) M: 500 ml U134, 0.268 tm(c)<ts(c)| c>0.18 c<0.31∗ − c>0.208no? L →0.88M Un?
0.12<c≈0.20<0.23 L: 1000ml U248, 0.248 U21<tm(c)<tl(c)∀c c<0.37∗ c<0.25∗ − No envy Eff. L
6. Rice (Japan) S: 2 kg U1030, 515 ts(c)<tl(c)| c < 317 − c>198∗ No envy Eff. S
198<c≈317<360 L: 5 kg U1980, 396 U180<tl(c)<990 c<436∗ − No envy Eff. L
7. Rice S: 0.8 kg R15.7, 19.6 R4.5<ts(c)<tm(c)∀c − c>15.88no! c>11.52∗? M→?S6←0.54L?
(Russia) M: 1 kg R19, 19 R5<tm(c)<tl(c)∀c c< 17.1∗ − c> 12.14no? L→0.62M Un?
7.8<c≈12.5<14 L: 25 kg R391, 15.64 R41<tl(c)<78.5 c<19.5∗ c<18.86∗ − No envy Eff. L
8. NesTea S: 330 ml R16, 0.048 R6.0<ts(c)<tm(c)∀c − c>0.078no! c>0.014∗ M→S Un. S
(Russia) M: 500 ml R28, 0.056 tm(c)<tl(c)| c<0.022 c<0.063∗ − c>-0.001∗ No envy Eff. M
0.017<c≈.027<.030 L: 1500 ml R50, 0.033 µ[tl(c)>ts(c)]= 0.98 c <0.044∗ c<0.045∗ − No envy Eff. L
Table 1: Legend: S, M, L stand for small, medium and large package sizes, Und. or Un. means an
“undersized” package, Ov. means an “oversized” package. Sign (∗) means that IC constraint is definitely
satisfied as non-active (no envy). Sign (no?) means that IC constraint is probably active and probability is
given in column 9, (no!!) means definitely envy (positive consumer surplus), while (∗?) means probably no
envy. In column 4 µ[X] is the probability that condition X is true.
Data (2005): Coca-Cola prices are for vending machines in Japan, and gasoline stations in the US (the
strangely-cheap biggest bottle is not cooled, so our conclusion maybe questionable). Rice data from Japan
are simplified: actual menu may include package of 1 kg (rather rare) and a package of 10 kg, which is
priced exactly twice the price of a 5 kg package (so excluded here). Rice data in Russia are from small
wholesale stores. Subway Sandwich include ham, turkey, tuna and roast beef, for the same prices.
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An example where the efficiency condition for higher-profit package i is questionable,
appears when checking envy link M → S for rice in Russia, because package i = M itself
may be envied by L. Here our conclusion M → S remains questionable (though (11) is
definitely violated!) due to problem discussed in Revelation Algorithm Step-2-ii above.
Another such example is milk in Japan, explained in Appendix, Example A.4.
Another uneasy issue is when some theoretical value cij lies within empirical cost-interval
[cmin, cmax], like for milk or Coca-Cola in Japan. It means possible equality of incentive
constraint (ij). We try to estimate probability of A-envy, marked by sign (no?) if it seems
more probable than no-envy, or by (∗?) in the opposite case. Roughly, the closer theoretical
cij lies to the median (unequal to the mode here!) of empirical density for c, the closer is
probability of envy to 1/2. But for more correct calculation of probability, instead of cij we
compare “theoretical” consumer surpluses sij calculated by formula (10) with “empirical”
interval [siimin < siimode < siimax], calculated from cost-interval [cmin < ciimode < cmax].
This estimation results in probability of most probable conclusion, as shown by numbers
0.77, 0.88 etc. in column 8 for all three cases of suspected envy or suspected no-envy:
Coca-Cola, Milk, Rice.
If the criterion (11) is definitely violated for all c, we mark this inequality by (no!),
and declare envy i → j in column 8, together with the direction of distortion (Over- or
Under-sizing). Such distortion conclusion is defifite only for Nes-Tea example.
Column #4 shows another efficiency indicator. Instead of using Theorem 2, “no-envy”
is detected in some cases by Proposition 2: the package with lower net-tariff (profit) cannot
“envy” the higher-profit one. Say, such comparison works between M and L for US Coca-
Cola: tM(c) > tS(c) > tL(c) for almost all c, so M 6← L 6→ S 6→ M . But further reveling
the envy-graph goes only for the price of restricting the shape of demands.
To comprehend the details of calculations in Table 1, rather difficult example “Milk in
Japan” is analysed in Appendix (Example A.4).
Notice that in many examples, even without knowing exact costs, our method can con-
vincingly detect absence of envy and thus efficiency, though somewhere ambiguity remains.
4. 3. Empirical Observations
Turning now from explaining methodology to observing the screening outcomes, notice
that in Table 1, star-structure of envy and efficiency are detected rather undoubtedly for
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Evian water and rice in Japan, Subway Sandwich and Coca-Cola in the US. These four
can be named “horizontal” product lines. In contrast, Coca-Cola from Japan is likely
to demonstrate a vertical, but non-classical, “reverse-chain” structure S→L→0. Here the
smaller package is most profitable, so it is envy-free and efficient by Proposition 2, while
the bigger package probably is envied by smaller package, therefore being oversized by
Theorem 2(iii). Different is example Milk, which probably shows a 2-layered tree structure
like Fig.2(d) (page 10): S→0←M←L or S→0←M←L→0 (here the presence of “bypass”
L→0 cannot be confirmed or ruled out without additional data). So, the medium pack-
age should be undersized with high probability, depending upon the actual marginal cost
(see explanations in Appendix). The only case that probably demonstrates the textbook
“decreasing-chain” structure L→M→S→0 and the Spence-Mirrlees condition or “vertical”
product line, is the rice example from Russia (with some ambiguity). In summary, ac-
counting also for other similar examples that we have studied, we argue that “horizontal”
overall-efficient package-pricing is not a rare phenomenon among food and beverages, while
“vertical” (Spence-Mirrlees) ordering seems rare.
Thus we have shown how our method works and reveal the envy-structure and (in-
)efficiency, even under imperfect knowledge of cost. Next stage of analysis would be to
try applying it to representative samples of special markets: foods, labour, etc., to reveal
(in-)efficiency and vertical or other ordering of preferences, and compare the outcomes with
intuition or other methods of judgements on these issues.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
The paper analyzes discrete-agents screening or second-degree price discrimination with-
out any assumption on ordering of preferences. The goal is diagnosing social efficiency or
distortion of equilibria from observations. Three efficiency indicators are developed.
First, when nobody “envies” certain package, this package is efficient, otherwise it
is distorted (generically). To rigorously obtain such an assertion, the notions of “envy”
and envy-graphs are developed, previous theorems of this kind are corrected, extended and
supplied with counter-examples. Second, ordering of per-package profits corresponds to the
envy-graph: predecessors have higher profit than successors. The most profitable package
is always envy-free and efficient, that entails overall efficiency under equal profits among
all.
32
Third criterion, based on demands parameterization, is most practical, because it uses
only information of quantities, tariffs, and rough estimates of cost. Certain inequations
((11) or (8)) must be satisfied for efficiency of a package. Intuitively, moderately large
discounts on bigger packages are likely signals of efficiency.
The empirical part of the paper demonstrates our efficiency-revelation method and also
realism of many kinds of envy-graphs. A classic chain-graph of Spence-Mirrlees type was
found only once among several food items and beverages. Instead, more typical are other
structures, generating either overall efficiency, or over-, or under-sizing.
Our strongest conclusions rely on assumptions that: (1) the menu is monopolistic profit-
maximizing; (2) the consumer groups are rather distinct; (3) the commodity is unidimen-
sional and the demands are linear. So, useful extensions would be to relax these assump-
tions, especially – to derive analogous efficiency conditions for the case when consumer
types are continuous, but the package sizes are discrete (our model only approximates this
situation), and enrich the family of demands as discussed in Appendix.
APPENDIX
Examples
The following counter-example to Theorem 1 in Brito et al. (1990) and to Lemma 3 in
Andersson (2005) shows why the concavity assumption is necessary in our Proposition 1.
The example also explains four kinds of envies defined in Section 2, and makes a clear
distinction between active and binding constraints.
Example A.1: [distortion without A-envy]. Under non-concave valuations, the “star”
structure of A-envy graph can be insufficient for efficiency because of binding non-active
constraints. To see this, consider two net-valuation functions combined of pieces of parabo-
las in Fig.4(a) below:
v1(x) = max{4 − 4(1 − x)2, 5 − 516(4 − x)2}, and v2(x) = 7 − 716(4 − x)2 (in fact,
the same effect does remain even if we make function v1(.) quasi-concave, “ironing” it by
the horizontal interval [(1, 4), (2, 4)] shown in Fig.4(a)). Assume equal probabilities of the
two types m1 = m2 = 0.5. Obviously, the only first-best or the socially-efficient menu
is (x´1, x¯2) = (4, 4), which includes the summits of the two net valuations shown by thick
(x¯2) and hollow (x´1) dots. The related net tariffs (t´1, t¯2) = (5, 7) satisfy the participation
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constraints giving expected profit of 6. However, it is easy to calculate that incentive-
compatible profit-maximizing menu is different: (x¯1, x¯2) = (1, 4), (t¯1, t¯2) = (4, 7), as shown
by the thick dots. The profit is only 5.5. Thus, in spite of the star-structure of active-envy
graph, the equilibrium menu (x¯, t¯) is distorted (x¯1 < x´1 = 4) ||
To understand this effect and the difference between B-envy and A-envy statements
in Proposition 1, note that, unlike A-envy, the B-envy graph here does not have a star-
structure. Indeed, agent #2 has a “shadow” binding-envy (SB-envy, which is SB = B \A)
to a potential (but unused) package (x´1, t´1) = (4, 5) (hollow dot), which could be profitable
if not for IC constraint.
By the way, one can obtain similar “shadow” binding non-active constraint, even under
strict concavity by slightly modifying the next Example A.2 (Fig.4(b)). Just make the
highest curve v2 lower by a small amount, making sure it does not go through the peak of
the curve v1. Or shift the latter to the left to get such an example.
Example A.2: [binding A-envy which is not LBA-envy, and no distortion at the envied
node].
Consider three net-valuation functions again constructed of pieces of parabolas by
parabolas (solid curves in Fig.4(b) above):
v1(x) = max[4− (2− x)2,min(2x, 4− 0.16(2− x)2)], v2(x) = 4.5− 0.5(3− x)2,
v3(x) = 1.2− 12250(5− x)2 when x ≤ 5, v3(x) = 1.2− 1625(5− x)2 when x ≥ 5.
Assume small probabilities of the first and the third types, but high probability of the
second one: (m1,m2,m3) = (0.05, 0.8, 0.15).
One can check (computations are available from the authors) that here the incentive-
compatible profit-maximizing menu is (x¯1, x¯2, x¯3) = (2, 3, 0), (t¯1, t¯2, t¯3) = (4.0, 4.5, 0). It
has a star-structure of LBA-envy graph of both non-zero packages (though zero package
x¯3 = 0 is LBA-envied by #1, #2 and A-envy exists: 2 → 1), and brings profit p¯i = 3.8.
An alternative plan, the best among those that serve the third consumer is the menu
(x´1, x¯2, x´3) = (5.68, 3.0, 5.68), with approximate tariffs (t´1, t¯2, t´3) = (0.906, 4.5, 0.906)
(the new point x´1 = x´3 is the right-most hollow dot in Fig.4(b)), and a profit of only p´i =
3.7812 (that confirms not serving #3). Another alternative plan (x¯1, x¯2, x´3) = (2, 3, 5.68),
(t1, t¯2, t´3) = (3.096, 4.5, 0.906) could give a profit of pi = 3.890 7, which is bigger than initial
p¯i, but the plan is incentive-incompatible. This means that constraint 2 99K 1 is binding
(it is active also: 2 → 1). But this couple is free of LBA-envy: (2 6⇒ 1), because point
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Figure 4: 4 kinds of envy and related distortion.
Legend for Fig. 4: Main graphs for Examples A.1, A.2, and A.3 depict the indifference curves
active at equilibrium as solid. Equilibrium points are thick dots (x¯i, t¯i), marked for simplicity as
x¯i. The dashed curves are the alternative indifference curves, becoming active at alternative, non-
optimal plan (x´, t´). Each example in Fig.4 is supplemented by its envy graph, where each double
arrow (⇒) shows LBA-envy. A single arrow (→) shows non-LBA A-envy (active constraint).
A dash arrow (99K) shows envy within non-optimal plan (x´, t´), described by nodes 1’, 3’. The
dotted arrow (· · · Â) shows a “shadow-binding” (non-active) envy leading from the optimal plan
to alternative one. Another kind of envy is almost-envy link (3 ↔ 0) within bunched package
(#3 = #0), in Fig.4(b).
(x¯1, t¯1) = (2, 4) is the peak of v1(.). We conclude that package #1 is non-distorted although
link 2→ 1 relates to binding and active constraint.
Thus, in spite of of binding A-envy, which is not LBA-envy, we see no distortion in
package #1. Therefore, in Proposition 1(ii), LBA assumption cannot be replaced by a
combination of A and B-envy.
Here, like in Example A.1, agent #2 has a “shadow” envy for unused potential package
(x1, t1) = (2, 3.096) (hollow dot on the dashed potentially-active curve). This envy-link
(2 99K 1) restricts profit, so we see, that such “shadow” constraints can be binding even
under strictly concave valuations. ||
Example A.3: [Shadow-binding envy (SB) from a lower-profit package to a higher-
35
profit one].
To see that Proposition 2 cannot be reformulated for B-envy (instead of A), consider
three net-valuation functions (solid curves in Fig.4(c) above):
v1(x) = max[4− (2− x)2,min(2x, 4− 0.16(2− x)2)], and v2(x) = 8− 89(3− x)2, v3(x) =
3− 3
5.52
(5.5− x)2.
Assume numbers of each types: (m1,m2,m3) = (1, 1, 2).
The profit-maximizing menu calculation (available from the authors) results in (x¯1, x¯2, x¯3) =
(1.2, 3, 5.5), with tariffs (t¯1, t¯2, t¯3) = (84/25, 156/25, 3) = (3.36, 6.24, 3), and profit
p¯i = 15.6. Alternatively, if violating constraint 3→ 1, we could move 1-st package rightward
and construct another menu (x´1, x¯2, x¯3) = (5.6186, 3, 5.5), (t´1, t´2, t´3) = (1.905, 8., 3) with
higher profit p´i ≈ 15.9 > p¯i, the menu being incentive-incompatible.
Thereby, we again see a “shadow” B-envy to some profitable potential package (hollow
dot located on dashed potential curve: 3 99K 1´). But now it is B-envy from a lower-profit
agent #3 to a higher-profit agent #1. So, Proposition 2 about profit ordering cannot be
extended to B-envy version. ||
It can be added that all three examples are non-degenerate, so probability of such
paradoxes is non-zero.
Example A.4: Calculating envy-structure for “Milk in Japan” product line (Table 1).
Packs of sizes 200 ml, 500 ml and 1000 ml are sold for yen 81, 134, 248 respectively, with
average prices of 0.405, 0.268, 0.248 per ml.
We assume three distinct groups of consumers: those buying small-size, medium-size
and large packages. Corollary 3.2 shows only negative answer here: there is some envy. For
more definite diagnosis we use the Structure-revelation algorithm, and start with finding
ordering of package profits on interval [cmin, cmax]. Say, inequality tm(c) = Tm − cxm =
134 − 500c < ts(c) = 81 − 200c gives solution c > 0.176 ∈ [cmin, cmax], reported in column
#4. Another two profits relations are tm(c) < tl(c) ∀c ∈ [cmin, cmax], and ts(c) < tl(c) ⇔
c < 0.209 ∈ [cmin, cmax] = [0.124, 0.225]. This c < 0.209 is true with probability 0.95,
because (c− cmax)2/((cmax − cmin) ∗ cmode) ≈ 0.95 wich is the integral of triangular density
with mode cmode = 0.198.
So, L is almost for sure the highest-profit package, so efficient one, and checking envy-
links (L 6→ S), (L 6→M), by relation (11) is justified. The first no-envy relation is confirmed
for all c, so marked with (∗), but the second one is wrong with probability 0.88 (L→M).
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To calculate this 0.88, from formula (??) we find interval [sLM min, sLM max] = [−17.5, 84.]
for surpluses sij = sLM(c) possible under all admissible costs and the mode sLMmode = 9.6 of
this interval related to cmode. Then we use again formula (0−smin)2/((smax−smin)∗smode) for
finding integral ν ≈ 0.02 measuring triangular density from smin to 0. Then the probability
needed is µ[sLM(c) > 0] = 1 − ν = 0.88. So, with high probability (L 6→ S) and (L →
M) entailing undersized M , besides conclusion about reverse links (S 6→ L),(M 6→ L) is
confirmed by Proposition 2.
What remains is to check envy (S,M), (M,S), separately for cost interval [cmin, 0.176]
and for [0.176, cmax]. In the first caseM is higher in profit than S, so not lower in the envy-
graph, that gives (S 6→M). But the opposite link is hard to check since M is envied by L
and Theorem 2 is not applicable to this link (M,S), ambiguity here remains. In another
case c ∈ [0.176, cmax] no-envy (M 6→ S) is confirmed by Proposition 2 and Theorem 2 is
applicable to reverse link (S,M), confirming (S 6→M), so it is true in both cases.
Thus we have found envy-links whenever possible. ||
PROOFS AND AUXILIARY RESULTS
For propositions concerning “envy,” we need the following lemma, requiring only quasi-
linearity of utilities (to prove such lemma for more general utility functions u(x, t), they
should be continuous, strictly decreasing in t, and u(x,∞) = −∞).
Lemma 1: [Spanning-tree lemma 21]. For any equilibrium menu (x¯, T¯ ) its LBA-envy
graph G(x¯, T¯ ) is “(in-)rooted,” i.e., each node is connected to the root (#0) by a path
directed to it. In other words, this LBA-graph G(x¯, T¯ ) contains a spanning-tree.
Corollary A.1: The A-envy graph is rooted, the B-envy graph is also rooted, and so is
the binding-active-envy graph (the intersection of B and A graphs).
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose, the “root” (0,0) is free of LBA-envy, i.e., no participa-
tion constraint (i → 0) is locally-binding and active. The specific form of the constraints
shows that in this case all tariffs (T1, ..., Tn) could be increased simultaneously by some
(same) small amount without violating any constraint in the optimization program (quan-
tity x being unchanged). This contradicts profit maximization at (x¯, T¯ ). So, the set L1
21 Our version differs from seminal such statement in Rochet (1987) and all later versions
including Proposition 1 in Andersson (2005): we exploit stronger LBA constraints instead of
“active” constraints, use new graph language and shorter proof.
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(layer 1 of the graph) of agents showing LBA-envy for the root (0,0) is non-empty. If the
compliment-set N \ L1 is empty, then the Lemma is proved. Otherwise, suppose that in
N \ L1, the lower layers #0 and #1 are free of LBA-envy. Then, for the same reason,
it again contradicts the optimality of (x¯, T¯ ), so the second layer L2 is nonempty, thereby
(indirectly) connected to #0. Repeat this logic for all layers until the finite number N is
exhausted. Thus, by induction the lemma is proved. ¤
In addition to Lemma 1, one can get some knowledge of feasible A-envy solution struc-
tures under strict concavity from Guesnerie and Seade (1982), and Brito et al. (1990);
directed cycles cannot include more than 2 nodes, and further all cycles can be eliminated
without loss of profit. This last result and our Proposition 1 rely on the bunching idea
shown in the proof of Proposition 2 below.
Proof of Proposition 2: [higher in A-envy graph ⇒ more profit]. (i): We should
prove that if a node i weakly precedes j in the related A-envy-graph G(x¯, T¯ ) (i º j), then
i brings weakly higher profit per package: ti ≥ tj. Consider the opposite case when nodes
i, j are adjacent and tj > ti. Then the principal simply should move the envying node
to the envied one along the active indifference curve (i.e., bunch them together). This
modification increases profit without violating any constraint. Thus, hypothesis (tj > ti)
contradicts the profit-maximizing assumption, so ti ≥ tj. Further, by induction we can
extend this claim to any i º j, i.e, to any path, not just the adjacent nodes. Claim (ii) is
proved along the lines of Proposition 4 in Brito et al. (1990). ¤
Proof of Proposition 1-(i-B): [no B-envy towards i0 ⇒ efficient xi0 ]. It is conve-
nient to reformulate the optimization problem in terms of net valuations vi(xi) = Vi(xi)−
C(xi) as in (13) below. We have assumed that all constraints like (j → i0) can be elim-
inated from the optimization program. But, by Lemma 1 and its Corollary A.1, some
constraint from i0 to some j of the type (vi0(xi0)− ti0 ≥ ui0 := vi0(xj)− tj) must be active
and binding. So, we can express ti0 = vi0(xi0)− ui0 (this value ui0 is the same in all active
links from i0 → k ∀k). The objective function (
∑n
i=1miti) is separable w.r.t. agents,
so after substituting ti0 into it, we maximize vi0(xi0) jointly with other variables under
the remaining constraints that include this expression vi0(xi0) only in the left side of the
inequalities like vi0(xi0) ≥ .... Then vi0 attains its unconstrained maximum at x¯i0 , which
implies efficiency. ¤
Now consider version A of Proposition 1, the difference being understandible from Ex-
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ample A.1 above.
Proof of Proposition 1 (i-A):22 [concavity, no A-envy towards i0 ⇒ efficient xi0 ].
Here the concavity condition can be replaced by strict quasi-concavity and continuity,
and we prove the claim for both versions (by the way, only the properties of two functions
vj, vi0 matter, not all vk). We use the logic from Proposition 1(i-B) and the related program
reduction to optimizing just vi0(xi0). Suppose, there is only one agent i0 taking package
(x¯i0 , T¯i0). We must ensure that, because all IC constraints (j → i0 ∀j) are not active
(i.e., Vj(x¯j)− T¯j > Vj(x¯i0)− T¯i0 ∀j 6= i0) at point (x¯i0 , T¯i0), they are also not binding the
maximization of the net valuation vi0 , and the maximization of profit (by decomposition).
By continuity of Vj (which follows from concavity on R) and strict inequalities, there
exists a closed solid vicinity B(x¯i) = {ξ | ||ξ − x¯i0|| ≤ ε} (∃ε > 0) around point x¯i0
also satisfying all IC constraints, all other variables being fixed. Suppose the contrary:
x¯i0 6∈ argmaxξ∈R vi0(ξ). Take first the assumption of strictly quasi-concave function vi0 ,
then it has a unique local maximum, which is also the global maximum (x˜i0), so vi0(.)
increases at point x¯i0 in the direction towards x˜i0 . Similarly, such increasing follow also
from (alternative) concavity assumption: concave function increases or decreases at all
non-optimal points. Thus, in both cases there is a point xˇi0 better than x¯i0 (i.e., vi0(xˇi0) >
vi0(x¯i0)) in the vicinity B(x¯i0). This point xˇi0 also satisfies all constraints, because it belongs
to B(x¯i0). This additional welfare (vi0(xˇi0) − vi0(x¯i0) > 0) can be allocated between the
seller and the buyer by appropriately choosing Ti0 to increase profit without violating any
constraint. So, the package menu (x¯, T¯ ) was not profit-maximizing. A contradiction.
Now we prove the same claim for the case of a consumers group K = {i, ..., k} : x¯k =
x¯k−1 = ... = x¯i bunched with this package i0. Suppose there is somebody (say, k) from
this group whose welfare function vk does not attain maximum at the equilibrium point
x¯i 6= x˜k. Suppose, without loss of generality, that this k is the agent whose welfare
function vk attains the maximum value within B(x¯i0), among all {i, ..., k}, and denote
xˇk = argmaxj∈K maxξ∈B(x¯i0 ) vj(ξ). Then, replacing the assignment x¯k by xˇk for this agent,
we can again increase welfare and profit without violating any constraint. A contradiction
again.
Now, take the case of assumption no-LBA-envy to package i0. It means, that no con-
22 See footnote 9 for relating this proof to previous papers. The correct usage of any concavity
or quasi-concavity assumption is new.
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straints, except the participation one, locally resrict optimization of (xi0 , ti0), which immidi-
ately entails locally-efficient x¯i0 . Under concavity local and global optima of V (xi0)−C(xi0)
coincide, that completes the proof. ¤
Proof of Proposition 1-(ii): [LBA-envy towards j0 ⇒ distorted j0].
The idea is that LBA-envy “pushes” the quantity either upward or downward. This
implies distortion when no other consumer envies this consumer j and therefore no coun-
tervailing effects like those shown in Fig. 2(a) (page 10) can occur.
Our goal is to show that the unconstrained maximum of vj(.) cannot coincide with
quantity x¯j designed for this agent by the main profit maximization program, reformulated
now in terms of net valuations vj and net tariffs tj:
max
(x,t)∈R2n
n∑
i=1
miti s.t. vi(xi)− ti ≥ 0, vi(xi)− vi(xj)− ti + tj ≥ 0 ∀i, j. (13)
The question is: Can the component x¯j0 of the solution to this program coincide with
unconstrained argmaximum xˇj0 of the net valuation vj0(.)? Let us assume it does coincide:
xˇj0 = x¯j0 , and later on show a contradiction.
We prove that v˙k(x¯j0) 6= v˙j0(x¯j0) = 0 (v˙i(z) := ddzvi(z)). Suppose the opposite: the
quantity xˇj0 is also the argmaximum of vk(.), entailing [v˙j0(xˇj0) = v˙k(xˇj0) = 0] (k is the
consumer envying j0). The equilibrium package x¯k was assumed to be different: x¯k 6=
x¯j0 = xˇj, thus, because of strict concavity (or strict quasi-concavity, which also suffices),
the equilibrium package brings less welfare: vk(x¯k) < vk(xˇj0). Then profit tk from the
k-th package could be increased by moving k’s package (by bunching it, as in the proof of
Proposition 2) to a new efficient point (x˜k, t˜k) = (x¯j0 , t¯j0) along the active k-th indifference
curve (note it does not violate any IC constraints) to achieve profit t˜k = t¯k+ vk(xˇj0) −
vk(x¯k) > t¯k. This contradicts profit maximization at x¯k. Therefore, v˙k(x¯j0) 6= v˙j0(x¯j0) = 0,
to be used later on.
We have assumed that the Kuhn-Tucker theorem is applicable to problem (13) (see
comment on this assumption after the proof), and that there exist Lagrangian multipliers
λ¯is ≥ 0 related to constraints (i, s) that provide the saddle point (x¯, t¯, λ¯) of the following
Lagrangian: L(x, t, λ) :=
∑n
i=1miti +
∑n
i=1
∑n
s=0 λis[vi(xi)− vi(xs)− ti + ts].
Taking the FOC w.r.t. tj0 we can gather all terms related to j0:
∂L(x, t, λ)/∂tj0 = mj0 −
∑n
s=0 λj0s+λkj0 = 0, (many constraints from j0 may be active,
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but by assumption, k is the only A-envy link to j0). Therefore
∑n
s=0 λj0s > 0. Taking FOC
w.r.t. xj0 , we see two similar groups of multipliers λis:
∂L(x, t, λ)/∂xj0 = v˙j0(x¯j0)
n∑
s=0
λj0s − λkj0 v˙k(x¯j0) = 0. (14)
Here we have used the non-restricted domain of x ∈ Rn, then λkj0 > 0 by the assumption
of LBA on this constraint. Besides, v˙k(x¯j0) 6= 0 was proved above; while v˙j0(x¯j0) = 0 is the
assumption which we need to reject. A contradiction.
Now, to find the direction of the distortion (over- or undersizing), we use equation (14)
and inequality
∑n
s=0 λj0s > 0 proved. For a higher quantity for k ( x¯k > x¯j), strict quasi-
concavity of v means that v˙j0(x¯j0)
∑n
s=0 λj0s = λkj0 v˙k(x¯j0) > 0, because vk(xj0) is increasing
at x¯j0 < x¯k, left-wards from the peak x¯k. Then derivative v˙j0(x¯j0) is also positive at x¯j0 , so
x¯j0 is undersized and lies to the left of the maximum. The oversizing is checked in a similar
way. ¤
Comment on realism of the assumption used. Is the Kuhn-Tucker necessary condition
used in Proposition 1(ii) always applicable to problem (13) as needed? This seems generally
true, but to prove it the lemma below still exploits some restrictions.
Lemma 2. Let net valuations be continuously differentiable. If a solution (x¯, t¯) to
the program (13) has no directed cycles (circuits) in its LBA-envy graph, then the Arrow-
Hurwitz-Uzawa constraints-qualification condition is applicable and one can characterize
this solution through the Kuhn-Tucker theorem.
Proof: available from the authors. ¤
Conditions of this Lemma seem non-restrictive. Probably, general lack of directed cycles
in the LBA-envy graph of agent-nodes can be proved under strict concavity of net valua-
tions. This conjecture is supported by possibility of eleminating cycles even within A-envy
graphs, by bunching procedure (see Theorem 1 in Guesnerie and Seade (1982), Proposition
2 in Brito et al. (1990), or Lemma 1 in Andersson (2005)), and seems important for further
reserch in non-ordered screening.
Proof of Theorems 1,2: In the main text.
Proof of Corollary 3.2: Explained within the Efficiency Revelation algorithm.
Comments on generalizations.
First, for broader application of our results, it is important to point out some kind of
equivalence between (i) the equilibria of the profit-maximizing game discussed above and
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(ii) the equilibria of some standard tax-optimization problem. This equivalence, rather
standard in screening theory, makes our analysis applicable to redistributive taxation and
to public provision of commodities.
Second, here we have used one-dimensional quantity xi only in studying the direction of
distortion. In other respects Propositions 1,2 can be understood as multidimensional with
small changes (using derivatives or comparisons w.r.t. each component or w.r.t. direction
of increasing), the same goes for Lemmas 1,2. It is more tricky to generalize Theorem 1,
Revelation algorithm and Theorem 2. However, a three-parameter family of valuations can
be revealed from a two-dimensional commodity variable plus tariff variable, and the general
methodology still remains valid.
Third, there can be a natural extension of our Theorem 2, in essence approximating
any demands by their Taylor decomposition. So far we have used only two derivatives, re-
sulting in such important demand characteristics as “chocking price” and efficient quantity.
Accompanying these by the third derivative, describing the curvature of demands, seems to
give an approximation sufficient enough for practice. Then we can work on this demands
parameter (roughly estimated somehow) in probabilistic manner, exactly like we did with
the unknown costs, with the same method.
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